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PRICE-BY WAY OF LITIGATION 
I. 
It ought to be obvious that value is the most relative of things. For 
value is worth and worth is what men make it. 
It has not always been so. A primitive people may make value a 
sttbst~nce and hold it unchanging against all that comes to pass. Amid 
the slow tempo of the Middle Ages value came to inhere in a good and 
kept its pristine purity so long as its abode escaped physical harm. In 
an utopia-whether of the good old times or of things vainly hoped 
for-value is value and in its static verity stands foresquare against all 
the winds that blow. In the mind of the reasonable man, in a prevailing 
commonsense; in many a speculative system there is a fundamental 
oughtness about what a thing will fetch. Today a large domain of action 
takes its way as if value were a verity fashioned from an absolute that 
can be captured for everyday duty. Its reiterated appearance, clothed in 
the rhetoric of "intrinsic", "fair", and "right", attest the eternal essence 
which men have comfortably found in a concept whose emergent origin 
they ignore. 
Yet a value is not just a value. Its magnitude is not proof against 
what is and the unknown things that will be. In the subjective universe 
over which every man has unquestioned sovereignty, value obeys the 
caprice of its master. Addison may price an· ordinary heirloom at an 
exalted figure because of contact with generations of his ancestors; 
Dryden may chalk up a million dollars against unpublished manuscripts 
and nondescript effects; and there is no authority to challenge such per-
sonal estimates. But if for a consideration an article changes hands, 
such domestic appraisals wither beneath the unsentimental scrutiny of 
!ltrangers. In the market-whose office it is to strike a common denomi-
nator among estimates-a myriad of values emerge into a price that 
bears the fitful mark of a thing relative: For a price is what it is-not 
in vacuo or for always-but to some person, at a given time, for a spe-
cific purpose and under definite circumstances. Persons are unlike, time 
moves along, purpose falls by the wayside, and circumstances change. 
In its very nature price is an expediency that belongs to a process; it is 
inseparable from the occasion and the play of judgments which have 
called it into being; it comes, serves its turn, yields place and leaves the 
stream of events a little different. It is the reflection of the curre~t use 
to which a thing can be put, a record of the pecuniary magnitude with 
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which for the moment a culture endows an object. Price marks the ac-
commodation of a ware of trade to its industrial habitat. ' 
But the obvious is often the irrelevant; and it is an occasion for 
repentence and rejoicing, for sackcloth and hallelujahs, that James Bon-
bright has arrested a concept at large, robbed it of cosmic pretentious-
ness, and given it a local habitation among human affairs.1 When he 
brings to his argument the concretion of analysis and illustration from 
every domain of the law the call is for the mourner's bench and then a 
Roman holiday. 
II. 
In a concern with value the law appears in an unusual role. As the 
act of purchase and of sale takes its endless course, the market generally 
decrees the terms of the bargain. In each instance the price must be 
low enough to entice the purchaser to acquire, and high enough to induce 
the vendor to part with, the ware. But within the tolerance which their 
subjective appraisals allow the market is the arbiter of conflicting judg-
ments.2 It has for centuries been habituated to that task; its devices, its 
procedures, its arrangements have emerged in the performance of its 
office. In the making of prices the market is at its trade. 
It is only when the market is not at hand to turn the trick that the 
law is called upon to name the price. Jonson may negligently damage 
Hume's automobile, wantonly disfigure his ancestral clock or contuma-
ciously distort his reputation. A fiction passes the injured article-or 
the part or aspect of it beyond repair-along to the offender in a com-
pulsory sale; and he must compensate what he eannot make good. Or 
the state takes Milton's land for a public purpose, and magnitude must 
1 BoNBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY (1937). It is inevitable that 
Bonbright's volumes should mea~ many things to many men. A majority may 
find his ideas about the relativity of value painful or even impossible going; a 
minority will call the bare thesis obvious-once he has said it. Here is set down 
the reactions of a single reader. The treatise is of most interest to persons whose 
minds are already somewhat steeped in the matters with which it is concerned. In 
this instance it has come as a precipitant to fuse into a conception of the problem 
a medley of ideas which for some time have been vaguely taking shape. As a re-
sult this account is far too tainted with the experience of another to be called an 
adequate report It is marked, too, with the expression of a personal preference 
in regard to the way of rate-making. That preference must be noted-but it can-
not be set down as reprehensible, for public policy cannot escape a like commit-
ment. A fair critique demands an able, intelligent, well-stocked-and previously 
uninformed and unformed-mind. But in this universe of public utilities, the ju-
dicial process, and critical law reviews, such a thing cannot be. It is just as well; 
for this treatise will be of the greatest value to those who must grapple with the 
questions with which it is concerned. It is significant that, like value itself, purpose 
must endow these volumes with importance as variously they serve a host of 
readers. 
' Their estimates are themselves reflections from the continuous stream of 
market transactions. A seller's subjective appraisal is habitually tempered by what 
he expects his ware to fetch. 
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be given to a price in an involuntary transaction. Or-without even the 
fiction of a choice-:-Steele is a customer of a certain purveyor of elec-
tric light and power; and, by a presumption which makes the bargain go, 
he pays a charge which includes "a fair rate of return" for "the use of 
the property." Or, by a kindred fiction, a tax which is anything but a 
fiction is assessed as a toll due to the state upon Burns' equities in realty. 
In all such cases the law assumes the office of evaluation. In the 
absence of the market it takes an amateur fling in its role. It was not 
for such a task that the courts developed their pleas and procedures, 
their principles of evidence and their ways of judgment. It is generally 
a value in the instance-not that of a unit of a standardized commodity 
in the ordinary course of trade-that has to be determined. Judge and 
jury-for all the talk about the inexorable rules that impel decision-
are human beings attuned to personal appeal. The compulsions which 
in the market converge upon price to give it exactitude must in litiga-
tion appear as a record of fact. l'hey must, to be given their effect, 
undergo an ordeal of admissibility and be transmuted into the alien coin 
of legal evidence. They appear, not as impersonal forces to level 
magnitudes out of line, but as arguments to be assessed by a juristic 
technology. 
No forbidding barrier-save a dubious legal relevancy-keeps con-
siderations of sentiment and of interest inert. Commuted into per-
suasive appeal, they may count even against more pertinent realities. A 
quality of high worth seems to mark a property which is injured even 
though it is strangely absent from others of its kind·. The lamentable 
necessity of the dispossessed and the prodigal ability of the state to pay 
are the characteristic marks of condemnation proceedings. The trend 
of the value of property for rate-making purposes takes an upward 
curve, while the value of the same property in respect to tmmtion, glides 
gently downward. The personal litigant, whether natural or corporate, 
is weighted a bit in the judicial scales against a generic and diffused in-
terest such as that of the public, the community or the body of consum-
ers. 
Legal concept, technical plea, and rule of law obtrude to deflect 
judgment from the result which a strict economic procedure would 
yield. A host of hazards beset the attempt to reduce the relevancies of 
price to a legal equation,3 to resolve a host of incommensurables into 
3 By this time the reader has observed the repeated use of the word "price" 
and has doubtless accused the writer of a negligence little short of gross. The 
fault, however, is at least wilful, if not wanton and malicious. A footnote is no 
place to argue the matter, but at least notice of intent must be served. A price, 
for all its comple.xity, is a reality; you can go to market, garner prices, and set 
them down on paper. A value is something less objective and more formidable; it 
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an exact magnitude and to reproduce in the isolated instance the judg-
ment of a continuous process. In tliis endeavor counsel are at hand more 
intent upon serving the interests of clients than of helping an inquiry 
along. The resources of the profession are drawn upon to confuse as 
well as to clarify; and by litigants who stand to gain, delays may be 
invented and ingeniously protracted. As an issue goes forward it must 
face all the perils of a cause at law. Any one of a number of legalistic 
considerations may arrest or divert argument; a decision may be reached 
without the substantive question ever having been raised; a flaw in 
the ordeal may send the case back to the point of origin to begin its 
litigious journey anew.4 
Through all this legal maze the court must seek a "just price." 
Its quest must go fonvard without the multiplicity of deals, the mech-
anisms of precision and the cumulative correctives which the economic 
process depends upon for its exactitudes. In the open market, under 
the rule of competition, the decree is certain and final as respects the im-
mediate transaction; the books are closed upon the deal and business 
hurries on its way. Yet the price that is made is always attended by a 
presumption of error. A market that is forever in session appeals to 
itself for a reconsideration of facts overlooked, a rediscounting of 
rumors about the future, a reweighing of relevancies, and a revision of 
pecuniary judgment. The new price, established upon review, applies 
to the now instant transaction; it leaves the business of the past undis-
turbed and the judgments of the future still open.5 The law has no 
comparable techniques of neatness, dispatch, and exactness. Its way 
with a price is slow, cumbersome, and none too relevant. Its de-
cisions, for all the time in the making, do not reflect all the factors in 
the problem. It attempts to take a judgment.:.__when one has been ac-
represents an attempt to get beneath the ephemeral and capricious thing called price 
to something more basic and enduring. The bother with value is that as a magni-
tude it rests upon hypotheses which it is impossible to verify; in a concern with 
it the hazards of a speculative flight are not easily escaped. In the matters con-
sidered here price can usually do verbal duty without any great strain upon its 
ordinary meaning. Where "value" is found in the text of the article above, it 
should be read as within quotation marks ; the usage is that of the courts or of 
another writer. 
• For a single recent e.-.;:hibit of the procedural issues that can be raised in a 
rate case-and for an example of how far speculative argument may drift from the 
realities of price policy-see United Gas Public Service Co. v. Texas, 58 Sup. Ct. 
483 (1938). 
~The statement applies best where prices are flexible, respond quickly to market 
conditions, and are made under competitive arrangements. It has least application 
in respect to a monopoly price which is an expression of a policy which has lapsed 
into rigidity. As an industrial group takes control from the market, the making 
of price becomes an affair of the politics of industry. Accordingly its magnitude 
comes to reflect a political process not wholly unlike the administrative-juristic 
procedure from which the prices of gas and electricity emerge. 
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complished-back in time and to insert it at the point where the issue 
of value was first raised. In this alien domain the law has not been 
abJe to convert the procedure of error and appeal into even an approxi-
mate instrument of justice. 
The mills of litigation grind out precisions most laboriously. A 
certain grist they seem unable to escape. ·wrongs must have their 
money recompense; the damages from a breach of contract must be as-
sessed; the wrong-doer in the twilight zone between tort and crime 
must make punitive compensation. But in this everyday domain a task 
poorly performed is being transferred to other agencies.6 Private in-
surance has broken down the line between wrong and accident. In-
demnity for work-injury in the course of employment has passed to an 
administrative body and the disputes which attend the harms done by 
automobile are hard upon its heels. And into the evaluation of proper-
ties for purposes of taxation, condemnation, or rate-making the courts 
do not in the first instance obtrude. At so foreign a task their business 
is a review of evaluations made by appraiser, board of appeals, or com-
mission. In this domain the office of the court is self-imposed; it claims 
jurisdiction because of a personal right invaded; its intrusion translates 
a problem of mathematical magnitudes into a tangle of legal issues. 
There is nothing inevitable about its juristic oversight; its orbit is as 
wide as its own decisions have made it. It is an open question whether 
the more exact justice which it does in the individual case is an adequate 
return for the delay, expense and complexity which litigation has 
brought into the process of price-making.7 
III. 
In respect to rate-making the cause of action was allowed before 
the distant vista was open and the magnitude of the business was seen. 
• In almost every age and culture agencies other than the market have had to 
play at price-making. Among primitive folk departures from accepted customs 
frequently have their pecuniary taboos. In the English town the wrongdoer made 
good his breach of liberty or ordinance by way of amercement; at the close of the 
Middle Ages military service and feudal dues were painfully commuted into money 
payments. Even the institution of penance developed its pecuniary conveniencies, 
and sins were graduated with meticulous e.'Cactitude to the degree of moral guilt 
and the affluence of the sinner. Among contemporary affairs the money analogue 
runs riot. To cite a single familiar e.'Cample-even in the law school of today the 
understanding which the student acquires in each course is set down as a magnitude 
and the items are aggregated and averaged into a claim to a degree. 
• Here the concern of the law with the personal is clearly in evidence. A cause 
of action has been allowed to protect personal right and to do justice in the instant 
case. The juristic process allows little direct consideration of injustice in the ag-
gregate; nor does it invite a juristic appraisal of the intrusion of the court in terms 
of the introduction of alien considerations and the multiplication and confusion of 
issues. 
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Until the Fourteenth Amendment-and for many years afterwards 
-the act of the state in the regulation of trade was the act of the state. 
It was of little federal or juristic interest. When, in the first great cru-
sade against monopoly, a measure of control was imposed upon railroads 
and grain elevators, the ancient law was not disturbed. The persons, 
natural or corporate, to whom the Granger statutes were distasteful, 
had lost the legislature; they quickly fell back upon the judiciary as a 
second line of defense. The cause of the investor, the magnitude of the 
stake, and the national danger in the dearth of unrequited capital' were 
ably and elaborately argued before the United States Supreme Court 
by eminent counsel and by Mr. Justice Field.8 But attorneys were un-
able to formulate an argument which would, against the accepted state-
ment of the law, stir the bench to interference. The court replied that 
"where property has been clothed with a public interest, the legislature 
may fix a limit to that which shall in law be reasonable for its use." 
And, to make the matter clear, it added, "this limit binds the courts as 
well as the people. If it has been improperly fixed, the legislature,. not 
the courts, must be appealed to for the change."9 Two dissenting jus-
tices protested that "by fixing the compensation" the state can take from 
a man "all that is valuable in the property." But, even to them in their 
righteous indignation it was "a waste of words to discuss the questions 
argued by counsel."10 
For thirteen years longer that self-denying ordinance stood. Cases 
came and went; and those who took to law received at best the solace 
of rhetoric for their pains. The court allowed suits. to be brought and 
thus a cause of action was established and a preliminary skirmish won.11 
~'It is not to be inferred that the power of limitation or regulation is 
itself without limit" ; "the power to regulate is not the power to de-
3 For Mr. Justice Field's statement, see Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181, 184 
(1877). For abstracts of argument of counsel, see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 
(1877) and cases following. 
• Mr. Chief Justice Waite, in Peik v. Chicago and Northwestern Ry., 94 U.S. 
164, 178 (1877). 
10 Mr. Justice Field, with whom Mr. Justice Strong concurred, in Stone v. 
Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181, 186 (1877). . 
11 It is of note that in every aspect of the development of the doctrine of due 
process, the case was entertained and the cause of action allowed sometime before 
the substantive commitment was made. For the right of man to his occupation 
see the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873) and Yick Wo v. Hop-
kins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). For the denial of a taking of "property," Munn 
v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1877) and Allgeyer v. Lonisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897). 
For the review of a structure of rates, Peik v. Chicago and Northwestern Ry., 94 
U. S. 164 (1877) and Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 
418 (1890). And for the reading of civil rights into "liberty", Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
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stroy" ;12 "limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation."13 Here were 
dicta which by the right wind of opinion might be quickened into sub~ 
stance. And as 9lder members retired, young blood came into their 
places; and a radical court, untroubled by precedents which did not go 
its novel way, was ready to enlarge judicial review, shift the base of 
interpretation from powers to limitations and provide laisse:J~faire with 
a constitutional domicile. 
The occasion was provided by a cause from Minnesota. A state 
commission had set railway rates on milk without a notice to the com~ 
pany, a public hearing or an opportunity to introduce evidence.14 Had 
this been a criminal action judges might easily have become outraged; 
and it is small wonder that such departures from customary process 
could be set down as against the law of the land. Thus it was procedure 
that opened the door to judicial review; but the cause once admitted, at~ 
tention easily passed on to the essence of the controversy. The act of 
the legislature deprives the company of "its right to a judicial investiga~ 
tion, by due process of law, under the forms and with the machinery 
provided by the wisdom of successive generations." It substitutes "as 
an absolute finality" the action of a Railroad Commission which "cannot 
be regarded as clothed with judicial functions or possessing the machin~ 
ery of a court of justice." As a result, if "without judicial investiga~ 
tion the company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable rates" 
it is "deprived of the lawful use of its property and thus, in substance 
and effect, of the property itself."Hi 
An easy glide carries the court from the law adjective to the law 
substantive-and it is committed to the supervision of a new domain. 
It was the habits of the law, rather than the realities of rate~making, 
which decreed the formula for the adventure. The act was the act of 
the state; the invasion was the invasion of a personal right. It was, 
accordingly, the Constitution whose protection was sought; and the due 
12 Note the easy and all but unconscious carry-over of a doctrine from one 
domain of the law to another, and note what the mind does to it in metamorphosis. 
"The power to tax involves the power to destroy" of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, 
in McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (U.S. 1819), becomes "the power 
to regulate is not the power to destroy'' of Mr. Chief Justice Waite's more radical 
colleagues; and he allows them to have their way with his rhetoric. The subtlety 
is that of the Lord Chancellor in W. S. Gilbert's Iolanthe who by inserting a "not" 
in a perpetual decree provided the deus ex machina which allowed the action of 
the play to come to rest. The powers to tax and to regulate rest upon the same 
constitutional foundations and such a distinction between them has no constitutional 
warrant. 
13 Mr. Chief Justice Waite, in Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 
(1877). 
"Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890). 
'"'Mr. Justice Brewer, in Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 
134 u.s. 118, 458 (1890). 
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process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment served to get the matter 
before the court. In the appeal the word "property" was strategic. The 
whole argument had to focus, not upon the medley of considerations 
which must shape a price, but upon a deprivation of valuable assets. 
The bother to the bench was that up to that time there was no rec-
ord in the United States Reports of such a taking, no definition of 
property within the intendment of the protective clause and no precedent 
for a substantive judgment.16 In such a situation a borrowing of doc-
trine helps attorneys and jurists along their determined way. So the 
case was argued, as many cases before had been, as if in railways pri-
vate property had been taken for public use. The owner was entitled 
to just compensation upon the value of his holdings; his equities were 
not legally subject to confiscation. This argument of the bar became 
canonical in the opinion of the bench; and, as in dissent Mr. Justice 
Bradley explained the judgment, the court had acted "as if the consti-
tutional prohibition was that no state shall take private property for 
public use without just compensation-and as if it were our duty to 
judge that compensation."17 Thus for the argument of rate cases the 
line of relevance was marked out. It has many times been sharpened 
but its direction has never been changed. 
As stumbling had led to the formula of judicial review, so the 
courts stumbled upon so much of a principle of appraisal as they have 
come to possess. The accent could not tarry long upon procedure; the 
10 In the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873), an unsuccessful 
argument was made, in the names of "the privileges and immunities of citizenship" 
and "due process of law" in behalf of the rights of man-especially to his occu-
pation-against the chartered rights of corporations. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356 (1886), the argument for personal rights prevailed against a mu-
nicipal ordinance. In 1886 Mr. Chief Justice Waite interrupted argument in Santa 
Clara County v. So. Pacific Ry., 118 U. S. 394, 396 (1886) to state orally that the 
court was prepared to concede without argument that a corporation was a person 
within the intendment of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. But the case was decided upon other than constitutional grounds and the 
concession-except in respect to entertaining a cause of action-remained a dictum. 
It was, accordingly, in Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 
118 (1890), that for the first time business was accorded the protection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
11 In dissent, in Chicago, Milwaukee & St Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 
418, 465 (1890). It is significant that ne."\.1: to ex-Justice Campbell and Mr. Justice 
Field, Mr. Justice Bradley had most to do with quickening the due process clause 
into life. But, although he had been a railroad lawyer, he forsook the doctrine 
when it was applied to the privileges of corporations. It is likewise of note that 
Mr. Justice Miller, who had been most stubbornly set against reading substance 
into the prohibitions, in this case came over with the zeal of a new convert to stand 
shoulder to shoulder with Mr. Justice Field. Although he had originally developed 
the due process argument in behalf of the rights of man, ex-Justice Campbell was 
far too catholic to deny its benefits to the corporations who engaged his legal 
services. We find him within a few years of his initial presentation reading the 
privileges of corporations into its lines. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307 
(1877). 
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substantive issue had presently to be faced; and it fell to historical 
chance to shape the issue for the courts. A crusade for regulation in 
the late Eighties was followed by a depression in the early Nineties; as 
rates were ordered lowered, railroads passed into bankruptcy; and the 
coincidence attended the course of the litigation by which the orders of 
the commissions were tested. The cases were heard in the lower 
courts when the hard times were at their crest; they were disposed of 
by the United States Supreme Court as business took the upward curve 
towards prosperity.lS 
The appeal to the judiciary was premised upon the single issue of 
the confiscation of property. In cases, cast strategically in the form of 
bondholders against bankrupt concerns, attorneys put in legal claims 
for a fair return upon the totality of investment out of which the prop-
erty had emerged.19 The retort was that records had not been preserved 
and that figures were not available; that assets had been swollen by 
"injudicious contracts, poor engineering, unusually high cost of ma-
terial," and "rascality on the part of those engaged in construction or 
management"; that "many things have happened to make the investment 
far in excess of the actual value" ; and that "the financial burden im-
posed upon the property by injudicious conduct should not be assumed 
by the public." Rates should "yield a reasonable compensation for the 
use of the fair and reasonable value of the property''-and "no more."20 
Imprudence and dishonesty belonged to the past, engineering had un-
dergone improvement, prices had dropped to a lower level; and one of 
counsel neatly chiseled the proffered standard into the proposition that 
"the present value of the roads, as measured by the cost of reproduc-
tion new, is the basis upon which profit should be computed." It is 
thus, in the cause of the consumer from the lips of "the Great Com-
moner"21 that "the cost of reproduction new" makes its initial bow be-
fore the highest court in the land. 
It was hardly to be expected that the court should definitely re-
solve where it had inadvertently entertained. The issues were too 
multiple and tangled to be deftly stated or conclusively answered. Too 
many collateral considerations were present for a clean-cut attack. The 
introduction into the opinion of the court of financial statements and 
18 Smyth v. Ames and docketed cases, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). 
19 J. M. Woolworth and James C. Carter for appellees. Abstract of briefs in 
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 494-515 (1898). 
""John L. Webster, with whom A. S. Churchill was on the brief. Abstract of 
argument in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 478-486 (1898), especially pp. 479-480, 
where excerpts of the opinion of the lower court are quoted. 
"'William Jennings Bryan for appellant. Abstract of argument in Smyth v. 
Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 489 (1898). 
HeinOnline  -- 38 Colum. L. Rev. 1017 1938
PRICE-BY WAY OF LITIGATION 1017 
essays on the pecuniary plight of the separate properties embellishes a 
text of indecision with a rhetoric of certainty: The suits are disposed 
of with somewhat of comfort for all concerned ;22 but of progress to-
wards a definitive rule of law there is little. The rate-base must be "the 
fair value of the property" used "for the convenience of the public." 
But such a value emerges from "the original cost of construction, the 
amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market 
value of its bonds and stock, the present as compared with the original 
cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property un-
der particular rates prescribed by statute and the sum required to meet 
operating e.~penses." The company "is entitled to a fair return upon the 
value of that which it employes for the public convenience"; the public 
"is entitled to demand" that "no more be exacted" than the services 
rendered are reasonably worth."23 Here is a great democracy of stand-
ards, all equal before the law, and a formula for their resolution into a 
balanced judgment. 
So catholic a doctrine was at the command of cause and occasion; 
variations could be written at will by later justices upon a theme of 
Harlan. As case has followed case a medley of considerations has 
crystalized into the two competing doctrines of "cost of reproduction 
new" and "prudent investment." The theories alike stem from the de-
cision in Smyth v. Ames, are fashioned from the same idealogical ma-
terials and are pointed in the same way upon the value of the utility. 
Alike they appeal to the market, hold price in causal bondage to expense 
and furbish cost into a judicial basis for rates. Alike they came into the 
law to serve the interest of regulation, commission and consumer. The 
Bryan-Butler theory24-which had made its judicial entree during a de-
"" All the color and circumstance of drama attends the disposition of the cases. 
Mr. Justice Brewer had presided in the court below; it was his judgment that was 
at issue; yet he did not disqualify himself from sitting. In the court below an 
ultra-conservative had delivered the opinion; here an ultra-liberal speaks for an 
united bench-and Brewer, J. is on appeal sustained by Harlan, J. With even-
handed justice the injunction granted below is allowed to stand and the appellants 
are told that because of a return to prosperity the rates judicially decreed may now 
be too high and they wi!l do well again to raise the issue de novo. Every idea, 
interest, and argument presented at the bar is recognized by the court with an en-
gaging impartiality. An ignorant scholar, unversed in the judicial process, might 
suspect horse-trading behind the scenes. Instead the result is a wonderful testi-
monial to the recognition by a high tribunal of every interest at stake and its 
sensitiveness to every wind of doctrine. A great deal of criticism has been hurled 
at Mr. Justice Harlan for the many directions which his opinion takes. The fault, 
if fault there is, lies in the decision of the court which he was called upon to make 
reasonable. At establishing a dialectical harmony among a group of incompatibles 
he was eminently successful. 
"" Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 546-547 (1898). 
"'The Bryan is William J. Bryan. Supra note 19. The Butler is, of course, 
Mr. Justice Butler. See especially, McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 
400 (1926). It is engaging that two gentlemen so different in outlook and phi-
losophy should have united in the creation of the doctrine. 
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pression-came into dominance when prices were upon the up-grade as 
the perfect buttress to invested capital. The Brandeis theory-named 
for its leading legal proponent-has remained true to its original alle-
giance. 25 Almost avowedly the intent, of its advocates is to keep prices 
down. The theories are alike in their resort to a dialectical calculus as 
the way of deliberation. 
The theories have been rather legal magnates tugging away at 
litigation than rival grooves in which a judgment might be cast. The 
factors in rate cases have been too numerous and turbulent to respond 
nimbly to the commands of either doctrine. All during the Twenties 
"cost of reproduction new" was in the ascendency; but it had hard 
going during the Great Depression and had to bow before a rising com-
mon sense. For years "prudent investment'' was voiced, usually in 
dissent,26 but with a change in the times and in the personnel of the 
court seems destined for a more dominant influence. At the moment the 
course of substantive law is arrested; the rhetori~ of impartiality is con-
sciously employed; and from Olympian heights the court solemnly takes 
presumption, burden of proof, and inconclusive evidence27-and gives 
the commission a little the better of it or remands cases to begin all 
over again their leisurely litigious journeys.28 
So, as the years have passed, one term or another of the magic 
formula of Harlan has for a time prevailed. But the procedure has not 
made certain the way of rate making. Nor has it imposed a legal path 
upon the wandering preferences of judges. 
""In spite of their being cast in the language of the market, the germinal idea 
of both is juristic rather than economic; it is justice between the parties to a bar-
gain for the use of property. The investor is entitled to a reasonable return upon 
his prudent outlay-or its current value; in all fairness the consumer can be asked 
to pay no more. 
""Mr. Justice Brandeis, for the court, in Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 
258 U. S. 388 (1922) ; Georgia Ry. and Power Co. v. Railway Commission of 
Georgia, 262 U.S. 625 (1923) ; and, far more important, in dissent in Southwestern 
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, 262 U. S. 275. 289 
(1923); McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 421 (1926); St. Louis 
and O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461, 488 (1929). 
:r: For the recent trend, see Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corp. v. Railroad 
Commission of California, 289 U. S. 287 (1933) ; Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Tele-
phone Co., 292 U.S. 151 (1934); Dayton Power and Light Co. v. Public Utility 
Commission of Ohio, 292 U.S. 290 (1934); West v. Chesapeake and Potomac 
Telephone Co., 295 U.S. 662 (1935); St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 
298 u.s. 38 (1936). 
23 For a still more recent utterance see Railroad Commission of the State of 
California v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 58 Sup. Ct. 334 (1938). Note the 
reiterated "we cannot say that", "we have not been referred to'', "there is nothing 
whatever to show", "it does not follow from these statements that", "the evidence 
is not here", "we cannot say that", "we cannot say that" of Mr. Chief Justice 
Hughes' opinion. 
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IV. 
It was not the happiest of enterprises to which the cqurts stood 
conscripted. It was begun without chart or blueprint; its vagrant pro-
cedure had to be beaten into form by adventitious event. 
The work of appraisal had to go forward in an atmosphere of ver-
balism and dialectic. A pecuniary inquiry is played upon from all sides 
by emotion, interest, and legal plea. It is the utilities which have taken 
the offensive; the law reports are almost barren of cases brought against 
commissions by consumers for the reduction of rates. The technical 
prayer of a taking of property without due process has marked out the 
line of litigious combat. An alert group of experts-engineers, ac-
countants, financiers, lawyers-have been omnipresent to commute in-
terests that sought to be vested into legal rights which the Constitution 
itself must sanction. The commissions, under-staffed and with inade-
quate access to the facts, have had to accept statement of question and 
field of battle. The novel issues presented have been at serious odds 
with the ancient ways of the law. 
At the very outset the court embarks upon a fictitious quest. Its 
self-appointed task is to assess a property which has been taken for 
public use. Yet the property has not been taken; it is left in the hands 
of its owners. Nor has it, except by benefit of a figure of speech, been 
put to a public use. The enterprise produces, markets, and vends to all 
who have the will and the wherewithal to purchase a necessary com-
modity such as gas, electric current, or water. So far its situation is no 
whit different from that of the concern that purveys steel, gasoline, 
bread, or ribbons for public use. The difference is that, to avoid the 
expense attending the duplication of costly equipment, the State grants to 
a utility an exclusive franchise. It furnishes to the enterprise the 
shelter of an uncontested market; and attempts through regulation to. 
preserve for consumers something of the protection accorded them by 
competition in an open industry. It is this very exemption from compe-
tition which, in evangelical terms and with an unconscious judicial irony, 
has been blessed by the courts as a "dedication" or a "consecration" of 
a property to the public interest.29 The "consecration" has been the 
removal of the business from the tumultuous course of events to the 
monastic retreat of a closed industry. The grant of monopoly is a con-
venience of public policy; the consumers have had to forego the alter-
natives of a competitive market ; the schedules of rates demand super-
=>As long ago as Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), the judiciary, in terms 
of Christian service, began to talk about property dedicated to public use. It is of 
interest that consecration is losing its symbolic value. See Mr. Justice Roberts in 
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
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vision against a control by one party to the bargain. Yet a legal fiction 
narrows realistic issues into the court's sole concern with the value of 
the propertJ.30 
A series of fictions-established in negligence or by default-
attends a case on its protracted course. A cost-into-price formula is a 
fundamental assumption of rate making; yet nowhere within the com-
petitive order is ~t an expression of business fact. A return for the use 
of the property is only one among many expenses of production; yet 
others have been accorded a relative judicial neglect. The figures on 
costs presented by the company are usually accepted, at least with minor 
corrections; yet their magnitudes reside to no mean extent in the con-
ventions of the system of accounts. At best they are the pecuniary re-
flections of the current state of managerial practice; all of the up-to-
date· and the backward, of efficiency and waste, of prudence and 
recklessness in technology, organization and policy are summed up in 
their quantitative lines. An assumption of the volume of output is 
basic to every cost; the current demand usually furnishes the figure; yet 
product sold is product sold at prevailing rates-which are the very 
subject of judicial scrutiny. It is assumed, with little evidence, that 
consumption would be as high if rates were raised; and the possibilities 
in lower rates are too speculative for so judicial an inquiry. 
As focus is lost, the procedure becomes a legal ordeal. The re-
sulting bothers emerge from the approach to the problem. The parties 
at law, instead of suiting an intellectual procedure to its character, have 
suited its character to their own intellectual procedure. They have 
smothered a problem in price policy beneath the concepts and rules, the 
logomachies and procedures of another craft. Engineers, economists, 
public officials of whatever persuasion would never have resolved the 
pertinent questions into so single an issue as the value of property. It 
was the lawyer, seizing the question with the antennae of his trade and 
intent upon throwing constitutional safeguards about corporate inter-
ests, who set the form. In the service of his client he sees that invest-
ment is more ~an-and different from-a tangible physical entity ; his 
trade is to see that property is not taken without due process of law; 
his immediate task is to swell the magnitude which the law can be made 
::o Repeatedly the courts have said that the States have full power to regulate 
the rates of public utilities and that the federal judiciary will not interfere unless 
the rates are clearly confiscatory. The complainant "has the burden of proof'' and 
the Court may not interfere unless "confiscation is clearly established." For a re-
cent statement of the position, see Los Angeles ~s and Electric Co. v. Railroad 
Commission of California, 289 U.S. 287 (1933). The implications of such a nar-
rowing of the issue have generally escaped judicial att<::ntion. 
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to allow.31 The intricacies of the rate structure, the considerations with 
which a schedule of prices must come to grips, the objectives of a public 
policy that finds expression in regulation-save as tokens in his litigious 
endeavors-are not for him. His technical vision and his industrial 
blindness unite to point question and to pattern procedure. 
In the borrowed verbiage of the Fourteenth Amendment the func-
tion of rates is overlooked and a preservation of value comes to be of 
primary concern. The property comes to be treated as if it were ante-
cedent to the use to which it is put and as if its values were casually 
independent of the schedule of charges. Yet it is only as an aspect of 
the industrial order at work that the utility is a property; its pecuniary 
worth is a reflection of the uses to which it is put and of the compensa-
tion for its services which the state finds allowable. An· acceptance of 
the constitutional issue and an escape from the circle demands a quest 
for objective norms. For lack of an alternative the courts accept-so 
far as legal procedure will allow and with the qualifications which the 
instant case suggests-the prices established in a free and open market. 
as criteria of legal justice. If the property existed in volume and was 
generally bought and sold, a ready standard of reference might be at 
hand. But since every property ·that comes into court is unique, the 
only recourse is to invoke a hypothetical market. 
v. 
Amid such a complex of factors and fictions, the courts have had 
to maintain an hypothesis of valuation. Among the meagerest of intel-
lectual offerings the judges have sought a theory which at all times 
would serve the interests of the parties and the cause of the common-
wealth. But in forty years of struggle they have not succeeded in ex-
tricating the issue from mazes of speculation; for the principle~ they 
employ are hypothetical.32 There, for cost of reproduction and prudent 
investment alike, the trouble begins, continues, spreads and turns back 
upon itself. 
31 It has no conventional validity or relevance, but curiosity prompts an un-
orthodox question about due process in reverse. If the values which a competitive 
'market would establish be taken as a norm, what of the property which the state, 
through commission and court, creates for a utility? What of values whose whole 
basis is in successful litigation? Is not such a creation a taking of the property of 
consumers? Is there not here a hypothetical cause of action under the Fourteenth 
Amendment? Can it be plausibly, even if not legally, argued that there is here a 
creation of property at. the expense of others without due process of law? 
""To call a thing a fiction is not to condemn; without its make-believe no legal 
process could go forward. But the function of a fiction is to beat a multiple reality 
into a manageable integer that will invite a simple procedure or a clean-cut. rule 
of law. The bothers here are that the problem is toppled off centre, relevant 
realities are dismissed and a fanciful inquiry is invited. 
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The principle of cost of reproduction now makes the more di-
rect appeal to a putative market. The property, however, cannot be 
set down as a tangible entity to be evaluated; as an integer it is not the 
object of exchange; it has no market price and none can be conjured up 
by a technique which is persuasive. It is therefore necessary to resolve 
the property into its elements, to appraise each part separately and to 
aggregate the amounts into a valuation. The presumptions are that 
each element has without the property others of its kind, that for each 
a market quotation can be found and that the value of the element with-
out is its value within the property. With such a group of "as if's" to 
give a lusty start, for a while the going is comparatively easy. Lumber, 
cement and engines have their technical specifications and their quoted 
prices ; the kinds of labor which go into the apparatus of production and 
the several rates of remuneration can be specified ; the current total ex-
pense of reproducing plant and equipment can be set down in approxi-
mate terms. 
~ut even so simple a march of mathematics is not untroubled by 
question and preference. For a material there may be one market, 
many or none at all ; the nominal price has respect to time and place, 
habitual discounts, the customs of the trade and other terms of the bar-
gain; a medley of conditions impinge to introduce fictions into the quo-
tation.33 The amount of labor which may go into productive equipment 
falls within elastic limits; the art of construction has its stage of de-
velopment and its degree of efficiency. The times at which expendi-
tures are incurred are not beyond human choice. A business will, if it 
can, arrange its expansion in such a way as to minimize investment. A 
municipality that sought directly to supply its citizens with gas or water 
would improve occasions to keep the capital charge down. 
All of this, however, is a matter of the relative simplicities. It is 
not a brand-new outfit, but a hand-me-down plant, that seeks a value 
from the courts. A number of rival theories proclaim how depreciation 
is to be written off ;34 and the march of technology has left its touch 
in obsolescence all over the place. Moreover, it is a business, not a phys-
"' What a thing of variables a price really is has escaped general attention. A 
price is only one of the terms of the bargain and its magnitude is at the mercy of 
the other terms. Even as respects the simplest quotations reality may be seriously 
at odds with appearance. The contrast between the pecuniary exactitudes of the 
courts in rate cases and the crude approximations of even the most stable of quoted 
prices presents a paradox inviting detailed inquiry. 
•• It is of interest that one of the most illuminating essays upon the rival pro-
cedures for computing depreciation is to be found in the law reports. See Mr. 
Justice Brandeis, in dissent, in United Railways and Electric Co. of Baltimore v. 
West, 290 U.S. 234 (1930). Judges have unusual opportunities for such illuminating 
essays; yet, in spite of the persistent need for clarity and perspective, their occur-
rence among the opinions of the court is rare. 
HeinOnline  -- 38 Colum. L. Rev. 1023 1938
PRICE-BY WAY OF LITIGATION 1023 
ical entity, which invites judicial scrutiny. By a fiction, values which 
inhere in the relationship of the going concern to the community must 
be imputed to the property. Intangibles are specific; they belong to the 
particular enterprise; as a vendible, real or hypothetical, not one of them 
goes to market. The "good-will" may savor little of Christian well-
wishing ; it may rest upon nothing more substantial than the nec~ssities 
of consumers who have nowhere else to go; it may be a reflection of 
exclusive privileges which lie within the very value the court seeks. 
Its sheltered, or even closed, market is usually its most prized posses-
sion; yet the creation and preservation of so valuable an asset is by act 
of the state. 
All along the way the precisions of calculation are driven on by 
acts of judgment. The techniques of accountancy are purposive--or 
they have been frozen into ritual. Figures obey their master or they 
go it blind. At almost every point choice has wide discretion; and, as 
the physical merges into the intangible,35 reckoning runs into the incom-
mensurables of policy. As item after item is passed in review, the par-
ticular question becomes merged in the general-and the end of the 
inquiry is its beginning. It is small wonder that, beset with such un-
certainties, attorneys should raid an alien discipline, capture an index 
number and conscript it to help calculation over the hard places. But 
such a device rests upon hypothesis, is still unperfected and has never 
been fitted for litigious duty. In rate cases it can do no more than ring 
changes upon a pecuniary base already established.36 It allows no es-
cape from the imponderables through which the reckoning must make 
its way. The cost of reproduction new is an anomaly. The property is 
removed from the impact of competition; yet an appeal is made to the 
market for an objective judgment of its worth. 
Yet the doctrine of "prudent investment" can no more than its rival 
escape its "as if's."37 It makes a brave beginning by forsaking a hypo-
"" The large discretion which attends calculation has never had adequate at-
tention. A couple of calculations, in one of which every reasonable doubt is given 
to the utility and in the other to the commission, would yield startlingly varying 
results. A guess may be hazarded that the difference would be vastly greater than 
the amount usually in litigation. See Note (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 81. 
"'-The argument must not be allowed to run off after the will-of-the-wisp of 
the index number. It must be dismissed with a trio of questions-or it will usurp 
many pages. Why has it almost universally been invoked to raise the rate-base 
on the upward swing of the business cycle ?-even when it did not serve to lower 
it when prices went down. If we grant that, in its sensitive reflection of price 
movement, it does well enough for short-time duty, can it be adapted to so pro-
tracted and decorous a procedure as rate-making by litigation? More generally, 
let the reader list all the presumptions which must be entertained if the inde.x-num-
ber is to become a useful device in rate litigation. In the answers the question of 
relevance will be resolved-without going further. 
01 As a practical matter the courts have directed too much attention to the 
theory of evaluation and far too little to the actual intellectual procedures from 
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thetical current market for the actualities of investment. If records are 
available and a rationale can be imposed upon a tangle of accounts, the 
sums which have gone into the property can be drawn forth and added. 
But, in their absence, the will-of-the-wisp of speculation returns. Nor 
can make-believe be dismissed with their presence-for at any moment 
there may be need to go behind the returns. It is unfair to call upon 
consumers year after year to pay an interest charge upon all invest-
ments-wise or speculative, honest or interested-which chance to have 
been made. They may with reason be called upon to support only such 
a capital structure as prudence would have decreed. 
But whose prudence? And is not prudence at a time, of an occa-
sion and under particular circumstances? Can the requirement of 
prudence be forged into an abstract rule for measuring human conduct? 
So norms, tempered to events in the past, are called for. A standard 
must be applied to managerial judgments that have faded into imper-
sonal entries; the actual prices paid as capital was invested must be 
checked against what in by-gone markets would have been reasonable 
outlays. All along the line the actual must be set over against the pre-
sumptive; and hypothesis is again harnessed to a colossal task. The 
theory can, from its acceptance of the value of property as the focus 
of inquiry, serve the public interest only obliquely. 
In such a parlous adventure the law is accorded little practical help 
by other disciplines. Accounting is still in the stage of rule-making; 
the question before the court concerns, not the validity of its techniques, 
but the choices that shape their use.38 Statistics has not as yet-even if 
it can-contrived equations for deriving the values of things that do 
not go to market from the values of kindred things that do. The rival 
schools of economics respond to the competing formulas as the practice 
of their respective crafts dictate.39 The members who lean towards an 
which the result emerges. The assumptions which underlie the accounts and cal-
culations-in concept, device and procedure-demand a critical scrutiny as thor-
oughgoing as that which Mr. Justice Brandeis has directed at depreciation. The 
pecuniary calculus no more than the court presents "a government of law and not 
of men." 
38 A footnote here may reinforce the one just above. In law and accounting 
the trade journals seem to mark different stages of development. Very similar 
questions may be asked about the processes of law and the procedures of account-
ing. Yet a critique of concept and method, an insistence upon purposive relevancy, 
a skeptical self-awareness which mark articles in legal periodicals has as yet little 
penetrated the literature of accountancy. It is still largely concerned with the in-
vention and exposition of techniques. • 
""Here the writer must take issue with Bonbright, 2 op. cif. Sllfrra note 1, at 
1078 et seq. The attitudes of the "institutional" and the "neo-classical" economists 
seem to me to be obvious. Neither ethical inclination nor scientific objectivity 
need to be invoked to explain them. Alike they proceed from the folkways of the 
craft as it is practiced in divergent camps. 
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institutional persuasion are inclined to accept the prudent investment 
theory as the lesser of two irrelevancies; it is only among the neo-classi-
cists that a handful of supporters for the alternative principle are to be 
discovered. 
To them the appeal of cost of reproduction new is professional 
rather than intellectual. It is not the argument as developed by the 
courts but the possibilities inherent in the concept which are alluring. 
Neo-classical economics is rather an argumentative technique than a 
generalized description of the industrial order. Accordingly a value to 
be deduced from an array of hypotheses offers an unusual opportunity 
for a superb dialectical display. The valuation must have its standard; 
and, since it is a matter of his everyday concern, the neo-classicist as-
signs the office of norm to the value which represents the free play of 
economic forces in an open market under conditions of perfect competi-
tion. Here is an ultimate reference-in fact and in fairness-between 
the parties to a bargain. And, as the economic cycle goes its round, the 
theory provides a neat and speedy adjustment of the rate-base to what 
the market decrees the value of the property to be. It may be true 
that, neither as an integer nor in its several parts, does the property go 
to market. No matter; the task of the theorist is to contrive a formula 
and to leave its application to skilled appraisers thoroughly at home 
with all the realities of the concrete situation. The result is an e.-x:ercise 
in hypothetics-subtle, involved, ingenious-an exhibition of deft ar-
gumentative skill. 
It is easy enough to quarrel with the neo-classicist-off his own 
beat. One may argue that the operation of a business is a continuous 
process ; that its going value, even with the help of ceteris paribus, can-
not be captured within a mechanical formula; that the procedure for-
sakes actuality for unverifiable speculation; that so intricate a problem 
will not yield to such a barrage of presumptions ; that the results will 
bear far more likeness to the methods employed than to the phenomena 
studied. It is easier, still, to insist that practice cannot live up to high 
professions ; that value cannot be made to respond so deftly to the 
changing decrees of the market, that the formula-as it is rewritten-
is at odds with the leisurely decorum which attends the administrative 
process. But, however difficult and uncertain the actual appraisal, the 
theorist stands by his principle. The norm of "perfect competition" 
is the only definitive reference available for a judicial "fair value." It 
is the standard by which under free enterprise prices are judged; it 
has the support of common-sense, of "orthodox" eco.nomics and of the 
anti-trust laws; it is firmly entrenched within the prevailing· ways of 
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business. ~till, the relevance of so hypothetical a formulation to the 
concrete issues which the courts must face-and resolve-remains an 
open question. 
The institutional economist, loath to accept "prudent investment," 
is unable to subscribe to the rule of cost of reproduction new. He is 
quite baffled as to ways and means of evaluating a property isolated 
against the impinging economic order.40 He stresses the hypothetical 
terms in which the problem is posed, the hazards to an escape from cir-
cular reasoning, the breadth of the orbit of personal judgment, the un-
real pricing of a thing not on the market. Nor can he, amid the stream 
of events that move on, accept a simple and direct correspondence be-
tween cost and price. Costs are the expenses which production has al-
ready entailed; price is the return which conditions converging in the 
market permit to be realized. If an establishment turns out a number 
of products, the causal line of cost-into-price is likely to move into re-
verse. Expenses which reflect market prices are habitually set down 
against joint products in accordance with their respective abilities to 
bear them. Accordingly cost is a complicated affair resting upon ante-
cedents as diverse as the methods of accounting, the technology of 
production, the volume of sales and the prevailing price policy in the 
industry. A cost belongs to history; yet it cannot be reduced to pre-
cision until the returns are all in.41 
It is true that so loose a relationship is not compelling for a public 
utility. Its affairs are subject to regulation; and upon a concern that 
holds an exclusive franchise the state may impose a cost formula for 
price. But to do so is a commitment to a particular policy against others 
that cry for recognition. For, at least within a wide discretion, costs are 
costs only so far as commission and court make them so. In fact the 
real question, as with many other authorized expenses of production, is 
""Again the issue is economic thought is not debat"lble. It invites no critique 
of "straight thinking'' and fallacy. The difference between the schools stems from 
a difference in postulates. The approach of the neo-classicist is mechanistic; he 
attempts to encompass industrial activity within a formula, a set of principles, an 
equilibrium of forces. The attention of the institutionalist is directed to the in-
dustrial process; he finds economic behavior an accommodation of enterprises to 
the course of events; his principal concern is with the fabric of industrial usage 
which emerges-and with its compulsions over human conduct. 
•• Like the relation of price to the other terms of the bargain, the relation of 
cost to price has had far less empirical attention than it deserves. Economist, com-
mission, and court alike have given the greatest attention to the value of the prop-
erty, the next greatest to the rate of return and surprisingly little to the relation 
of cost to price. There two elementary concepts have by the courts been endowed 
with a simplicity and an exactness which is belied by observable facts. A realistic 
approach demands a great deal more empirical attention than the foundations of 
price have had. For a partial statement of the problems, see Till, The Ficlio11 of 
the Quoted Price (1937) 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 363, and Hamilton, Cost as a 
Standard for Price, id. at 321. 
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what cost for the use of property is allowable. At this point the inquiry 
returns to the objectives the rate structure should serve; and here in 
the juristic statement of the question any function for price other than 
the safeguarding of investment is dismissed by presumption. 
The shift of the focus of attention from the schedule of rates to 
the rate-base has not been happy. As it has been applied, the theory 
of the cost of reproduction new is too clearly an articulation of private 
right to go unchallenged. It is too clumsily fitted to the rhythm of 
business activity adequately to serve the cause of the investor. A re-
sort to prudent investment can hardly hope to capture the actualities of 
the past and hail them into court for judgment; its appeal is as a prin-
ciple of future investment. But if capital-whether as outlay or in-
vestment-is to obey the rule of prudence, the quest turns away to 
judicial standards of investment and a system of police which will make 
them managerial realities. Prudent investment has been helped to the 
fore, not by substantial merits which withstand criticism, but by the dis-
comfort which scrutiny and the depression has brought to its rival. It 
is hard to make a legal rule of a principle whose favors depend upon 
whether years are fat or lean. Alike the rival theories lie in the esoteric 
domain of the hypothetics. The factors in a rate case are too multiple 
and involved to yield more than a verbal certainty to either attack.42 
Judges indulge the calculus of speculation. The value of property 
awaits the judgment of the court. The rate structure, as an expression 
of public policy and with its impact upon a culture, remains neglected 
in the offing. 
VI. 
An appeal from commission to court is not a one-way street. The 
utility becomes a slave to the legal formula it has invoked. The at-
titude towards its price policy is shaped by the pressures it brings to 
bear. As the bench will accept an issue in rate-making only if it is con-
verted into a legalistic concern with the taking of property, so its judg-
ments become pontifical decrees to which administrative bodies must 
strive to conform. Their day by day work must be done in the fear of 
God and of judicial review. The commission, caught between court and 
company, has little opportunity for a forthright attack upon its problem 
of prices. With it, too, the worth of the investment becomes the hub of 
42 Note the lament by Mr. Justice Butler over the imminent eclipse of his 
formula: "I cannot refrain from protesting against the Court's refusal ... reason-
ably to adhere to principles that have been settled. Our decisions ought to be 
sufficiently definite and permanent to enable counsel usefully to advise clients. Gen-
erally speaking, at least, our decisions of yesterday ought to be the law of to-day." 
Railroad Commission of California v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 302 U. S. 388, 
418 (1938). 
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inquiry; other considerations which should shape the rate-structure are 
relegated to the background, and the distorted administrative pattern is 
set. Current practice accords an invitation to acts of omission. 
Yet, for all the solicitude, the capital charge is only one of the costs 
which the receipts from a public utility must meet. It is in reality the 
value of the use of the property that counts, and this is a dual affair of 
the capital account and of the rate of return. The rate of return has 
received scant judicial attention. In aU the reports there is not one out-
standing attempt to shape a standard to the distinctive conditions under 
whi'ch a public utility must carry on. Again and again it is said that the 
rate must be high enough to maintain the flow of investment-with little 
consideration of the concretions which make it a distinct per cent. A 
large number of rates which have been approved seem to be copied from 
business enterprise when the going is good; and among them there is 
more than an echo of the legal rate of interest, a maximum established 
for the prohibition of usury. Too frequently the courts proceed as if 
there was only one true rate of return which was written between the 
lines in the Constitution ;43 but rarely is a comparison of circumstances 
essayed with enterprise not under the state's protection. A mark of dis-
tinction is the absence of the competition which other business units have 
to face; the property does not have to take the shock of a rivalry designed 
to take away its customers. It has-except for street railways44-limited 
the risks of the utility to its own mistakes in policy and operation. In an 
industrial order of uncertainty its security is unique; and since its shel-
tered market is a creation of the state, the rate of interest needs to be 
tempered to actualities.45 In fact, save as communities decay or de-
43 The classic statement is that of Mr. Justice Sutherland, in United Railways 
and Electric Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 252 (1930): " ... the com-
pany itself sought from the commission a rate which it appears would produce a 
return of about 7.44 per cent. . . . We are of opinion that to enforce rates produc-
ing less than this would be confiscatory and in violation of the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 
... Note the difficulties of the courts in writing off the values of street railways 
which have become obsolescent. The market exhibits no such solicitude; its im-
personal ways of liquidation have little regard to the just or the unjust. A full 
page advertisement of a street railway company in one of our large cities recently 
declared: "Our property in tracks, equipment and franchise is becoming more 
valuable. The number of our passengers has fallen off. We must increase our 
rates." Here is a priceless anomoly of price . 
.. It was out of the competitive order that public utilities emerged. The new 
for a while wears the verbal dress of the old, and the courts often voice the fiction 
of a competition. Here and there competition still is to be found as vestige, as ex-
ception or as threat. In a few places an "independent" telephone company remains 
a nuisance not yet abated. In metropolitan New York and some other highly con-
gested centres the installation of a Diesel engine can be made to provide electric 
current to a large apartment house or office building and its cost will provide an 
effective maximum for rates. A municipal or a small local enterprise may pur-
chase light and power from a government undertaking, such as the Tennessee Val-
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pression robs customers of their ability to pay, the utility is an estab-
lished, not a hazardous, enterprise and investors are pushed into the 
position of bond-holders. A moderate rate of return contributes as 
much to lower rates fl.S a lower valuation. 
But other costs have currency; and other considerations must be 
allowed. Rates, as well as the uses of property, are values; rates may, 
with the lesser violence to the word, be called prices. From the vantage 
point of rates the future rather than the past is faced ; there the func-
tion of price as a mediator between company and consumer is to the fore. 
In the rate-structure the utility comes to grips with the impinging world; 
in the schedule of its charges the degree of its public service is written. 
A long time ago, just as the courts were letting themselves in for this 
bothersome business, Mr. Justice Bradley insisted that a reasonable 
charge involved "considerations of policy as well as of remuneration."46 
The rate-structure of an utility is an aspect of public policy; it is an ex-
pression of what the community, aCting through the legislature, commis-
sion and court, expects it to do. Such a direct attack presents the prob-
lem of striking an equation among ever-changing and incommensurable 
objectives. A scheme of prices fixed by authority must reflect the office 
of the utility in the economy. 
The investors must be served. So long as reliance is placed in pri-
vate enterprise for the supply of gas, electricity or water, the remunera-
tion must be adequate to command the service. But, even here occasions 
differ; and, as compared with other considerations, the need for capital 
is more insistent at one time than at another. The investment market, 
too, has its periods of plenty and of scarcity, of high rates and of low; 
and a municipality might well impose upon a corporation the rule of 
economy which should mark its own outlays. Here, as throughout the 
field of business endeavor, it is the expectation of gain that is dominant; 
the historical fact of investment is relevant only for the promise which 
its record holds. 
In shaping policy an equal regard must be given to the consumer. 
The supply of an essential commodity is the very reason for the exist-
ence of the utility. Its corporate ownership and operation is only the 
ley Authority-if such an opportunity is at hand, thus restoring competition to the 
local market. Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 21 
F. Supp. 947 (D. Tenn. 1938). See also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 
297 U.S. 288 (1936); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938). It is of 
note that the power of the government to compete seems to have survived the epoch 
in which judges were most prone to read laissez-faire into the Constitution. Condi-
tions and costs are not comparable ; but here indeed is a "yardstick" -far closer to 
the actualities of the problem than the value of property-which if generally em-
ployed might serve as a legal corrective for the rates of private public utilities. 
44 See dissenting opinion, Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 
134 u.s. 418, 462 (1890). 
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instrument for getting the task performed. The interests called into being 
by the means chosen must not be allowed to obscure the ends sought. A 
question of significance is the adequacy of service. But adequacy is not 
to be defined in the routine terms of quality and regularity; nor is it to 
be limited to the supply of persons able to purchase on the current plane 
of rates. It must take into account potential as well as actual demand. 
A primary question is whether rates are low enough to allow to current 
customers full utilization, and whether the services are put within the 
reach of all income groups which should have access to them. Upon 
price might be imposed the public duty of insuring to gas, light, water, 
and power a secure place within the American standard of living.47 In 
fact a functional test should look to the years ahead ; a rate-structure 
should be validated in terms of its ability to extend the use of the 
services among all classes of the population. 
As policy a rate-structure has an even greater function. In the 
market the forces of competition beat upon an enterprise with compul-
sions to get its cost down, with prods to efficiency in organization, with 
spurs to technical improvement all along the line, with incentives to-
wards winning a larger consumer acceptance, with the continuing neces-
sity of accommodating the venture to its industrial habitat. With the 
passing of the open market, such impulses are dulled or even cease to 
operate. It accordingly becomes the task of the commission to contrive 
devices of efficiency as substitutes for the play of business rivalry. It 
is especially necessary to provide substitutes for the protections which 
an abandoned competition can no longer afford the consumer. Matters 
of consequence in other industries come to be of negligible consequence 
to the utilities. The creation of an atmosphere in which the value of 
the investment has loomed large has blurred the minds of magnates to 
other aspects of the pricing problem.48 An expansion of the market is 
47 It is engaging to follow the changing etymological fortunes of the concept 
"public utility." The word "utility", of course, comes out of economics; the "public" 
is the "public" of the old police power, as in "public morals", "public health", 
"public safety", and "public welfare". As late as the Seventies it was used as a 
correlative of "the common good". In his argument in the Slaughter-House Cases, 
16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873) ex-Justice John A. Campbell insisted that the statute 
before the court could not be justified as a health .measure because it did not "serve 
the public utility". The law on the subject was long in the making before it was 
garnered into the category of public utility. It seems high time for a restoration 
of the accent to the first word. 
""One of the most amazing things revealed by the National Recovery and the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administrations was the very different states of opinion 
that prevailed in various industries in respect to price policy. That in the dress 
industry was the result of a cut-throat competition; that in steel of a stalemate 
which led to a respect among gentlemen for each other's preserves. In automobiles 
prices had to be kept down to prevent the invasion of the industry by new capital; 
in milk they had to be kept up to cover extravagant methods of delivery. The 
fabricators of advertised articles wanted fixed prices ; those of unbranded goods, 
free prices. It took such an experiment to reveal how large an ingredient of price 
is prevailing industrial idea. 
HeinOnline  -- 38 Colum. L. Rev. 1031 1938
PRICE-BY WAY OF LITIGATION 1031 
accorded a negligence rarely to be found in competitive industry.49 The 
utilities-at least until the appearance of the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity-went their way as if all who use gas, electric current, and water 
were being supplied and there were no new markets to conquer.50 The 
invention of devices of protection and progress would, under the most 
favorable circumstances, tax the intellectual resources of regulatory 
bodies to the very limit. Their creation has been almost enjoined by 
the conventional stress upon the value of property. 
As policy the matter becomes price-policy. The rate-structure is 
an aspect of a program for the control of industry. It must be brought 
into accord with the other measures through which the state directs the 
economic order. A structure of prices that fulfills such an office is not 
to be plucked from the air or conjured out of any system of accounts; 
the legalistic value of an isolated property can throw little light upon it. 
It must take into account a wide range of factors which under current 
procedure are arrested at the frontiers of litigation. It can, no more 
than the price of a dress, of gasoline, or of an automobile emerge ex-
cept through experimentation. The way of its making is that of trial 
and error. 
In other domains of the law the public interest has enjoyed a lusty 
existence. Even when laissez-faire has found a domicile in constitu-
tional doctrine, the police power has been at hand to dispute its primacy. 
But if considerations of the general welfare have lain recessive within 
the formula of review, they might, at the kindly touch of the judiciary, 
easily be restored to the dominant role. It is only the later decisions 
which forbid ;51 and they have never been able to command the support 
of the full bench. In law a modernistic note may fail to allure where an 
•• A rather arbitrary attitude which is an aspect of the web of presumptions 
upon which the judicial review of the rate structure rests is presented in West 
Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (No.2), 294 U.S. 79 (1935). 
Here the court-without indulgence in analysis or statistics-lays it down that it 
will not entertain the presumption that lower rates may yield a higher return. 
""It recently took the fiat of the Interstate Commerce Commission to jar com-
placent executives into a realization that after a period of immunity the railroads 
again enjoyed vigorous competition from private automobile and motor bus and 
truck An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission forced them to lower 
passenger rates-and increase their earnings. It is significant that suit to enjoin 
the act of the Commission was filed but never pressed. 
01 See Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United 
States, 298 U.S. 38, 73 (1936). See especially Mr. Justice Stone and Mr. Justice 
Cardozo, "concurring in the result", id. at 93, 94: "We think the opinion of Mr. 
Justice Brandeis states the law as it ought to be, though we appreciate the weight 
of precedent that has now accumulated against it .... The doctrine of stare decisis, 
however appropriate and even necessary at times, has only a limited application in 
the field of constitutional law .... If the challenged doctrine is to be reconsidered, 
we are unwilling to approve it." 
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ultra conservative theme rings true.52 If function must find its sanc-
tion in precedent, the court of tomorrow may appeal from the status 
quo to the status quo ante. 
VII. 
Among the contributions of the Bonbright volumes, surely the most 
significant is the support they give to the idea that a price is relative, a 
theory of value organic.53 As a going concern an enterprise should 
forever newly adapt itself to its social habitat. A commitment to pub-
lic service should afford no insulation against the tumult of industrial 
movement; it should accord no immunity against the decrees of an 
economic evolution which exacts the up-to-date as the price of survival. 
As an integer the property is not more or less-magnitude is an ir-
relevance-but a thing different in kind from the sum of 'its parts.li4 
An attempt to break down, separately appraise and compound into a 
grand sum total invites a superb display of a mechanistic logic tainted 
only by its irrelevancy. An inquiry into the putative outlays which 
prudently would have brought the property into being is a hazardous 
exercise. All along its course it must cqntend with records-unavail-
able, incomplete or shaped to another purpose-and extract the de-
finitive from reconstructed managerial policies. It is as an element in 
rates that the value of property has pertinence-and rates belong to the 
present and exist for a purpose. 
The evaluation of the property lies along a by-way of price policy. 
"'In McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U.S. 419, 423-441 (1938). Mr. 
Justice Black points out the difficulties of threading the maze of issues and calcula-
tions to a definite judgment upon the constitutional issue and believes that the 
Court should order the cause dismissed. 
"'2 BoNBRIGHT, op. cit. SltPra note 1, at 1082, records a difference in reaction to 
the idea that value is value for a purpose from graduate students in law and in 
economics. He reports that the ethical sensibilities of the law students were wounded 
while the objectivity of students in economics rendered them proof against shock. 
It seems to me that ethics and objectivity have nothing to do with the case; it is 
rather a quarrel between the relative and the absolute, between a knowledge of a 
thing and a knowledge of the thing in terms of the questions asked about it. The 
issue does not separate economics from law. At present the difference in view-
point is found within the law and separates the economists into two divergent 
schools. The cleavage runs through physics, history, philosophy, and theology and 
not even mathematics is untouched by it. The response of students in acceptance 
or shock is primarily a matter of intellectual habituation rather than of previous 
exposure to a particular content. My e:..:perience is quite at variance with that of 
Bonbright. I remember vividly an occasion upon Bonbright's native heath when 
a critical attack by me upon the purposive character of economic concepts left my 
hearers rather bewildered and me quite inconfutable. In the law schools with which 
I am acquainted a similar talk would provoke no stronger response than "well, go 
on." In all politeness it is irrelevant; but may the writer add as one who has had 
experience of both kinds that-while there arc brilliant exceptions-as a genus the 
graduate student in economics is a more docile animal than his brother of the law. 
"'1 BoNBRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 1, passim, especially pp. 92-93, 109. 
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An intimate relation between the value of the property and the struc-
ture of rates-a presumption rather uncritically indulged by the courts-
is a fiction. It assumes a simplicity which industrial matters lack, dis-
regards the multiple forces which play upon earnings, and reduces the 
complexities of a going business to an elementary causal sequence. It 
insulates the property against the impact of the course of events and 
freezes rates of service and capital charge into a rigid ratio. It con-
signs to the oblivion of irrelevance the host of novelties-in technology, 
organization, manner of service, product-which in other lines of en-
terprise are the mark of adaptation and life. In short, in the name of 
the protection of property, it turns the price policy of a business con-
cern which should make its way in the world into an academic exercise. 
Nor is it easy to understand why a fetish should be made of pro-
tection against confiscation. It has little support in the sources from 
which public utility law is drawn. The openness of every trade to all 
who wish to take its risks had long been cardinal and the common law 
has no protection for a vested interest in an industry against a more 
efficient competitor. It is the right of access to the market, the oppor-
tunity to make good, that has been the subject of judicial solicitude. 
The concern has been for the trade; individuals within it are entitled to 
no more than their chances. In public law there is no such immunity. 
In the name of property, a statute may be str.uck down as beyond the 
power of the legislature; but, if it is allowed to stand, no protection is 
accorded against its impact upon vested values. The owner of a busi-
ness must take the shorter work day, work accident indemnity, the mini-
mum wage and social insurance with whatever grace and in whatever 
stride he may command. The state, by prohibition-as with lotteries 
and the traffic in white slaves; or by competition-as with gasoline or 
power-may lay on, and the injured party has no judicial recourse. It 
is only in the taking of property for a public use that a specific value 
comes under judicial attention; and here a strict logic can hardly put 
the analogy across; for what is being done is fixing a price in a forced 
sale. 
Nor is a legal security for the individual concern indigenous to the 
order of business. In the market an enterprise makes a price at its 
peril ; its quotations must take the impact of forces converging from 
near and far. There no value has a sanctity immune to disturbance; 
each appears as a revised edition of itself and must straightway give 
place. If a price becomes inflexible or abides while others change, the 
result is due, not to any legal right, but to assiduous endeavor of in-
terested parties or to the erection within an industry of a buffer against 
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the shocks of the market. In a day assets of significance may become 
worthless securities or a nothingness may be lifted into a prized posses;-
sion. In a year of depression an aggregate of tens of billions of dollars 
may be stripped from national wealth with no invasion of such a private 
right as the law will respect. The prevailing usages of business subject 
all property to the persistent threat of confiscation; and in the constitu~ 
tion of the economic order there is no due process clause by which the 
decrees of the market are made reviewable in the courts. A plethora 
of presumptions are needed to read into the Constitution an exemption 
of an individual enterprise from the ordinary risks of business and from 
the necessary oversight of the state. The obverse side of such an im~ 
munity is a limitation upon the right of the government to make of a 
utility an instrument of the commonwealth. 
In rate cases the protection accorded property by the courts has 
been nominal rather than real. The reliance upon the valuation of 
property has never been demonstrated to serve well the interest whose 
livery it wears. Nor is there reason to conclude that in the ordinary 
instance a different valuation and another rate structure might not better 
promote the fortunes of the enterprise.G;; Nor has it been shown that 
lower prices would not be attended by a much wider use of light anti 
power. Evidence from other industries, fortified by e....:perience under 
the Tennessee Valley Authority, set down lower prices as a plausible 
hypothesis for larger financial rewards. There must be a large potential 
demand which enlightened self~interest and far~sighted regulation might 
over a period of years quicken into being. 
The invocation of the courts is an e....:travagant expense to all con~ 
cerned. It brings into the process of price-making the devices of liti~ 
gation, contrived for another purpose, alien to the task, and set to a far 
slower tempo. The introduction of juristic procedures into the process 
of price-making is an invitation to frustration. The mixing of tech~ 
nologies which will not mix brings uncertainty, confusion, and endless 
procrastination into the affairs of regulation. The agency it has created 
for the just and proper. determination of value is a hierarchy of com~ 
pany, commission, lower court, and appeal tribunal ; the ritual that has 
emerged-with its array of order, err!Jr and appeal, reversal or reman· 
date-is a paragon of indirection. It could hardly have been more de~ 
""In law the testamentary truth depends upon the presumption. The writer 
would never contend that the untold millions spent upon litigation to maintain the 
cost of reproduction new as the law of the land has not advanced the material 
fortunes of the utilities. But if a bolder person should proclaim it, he does not 
know-a speculative argument aside-what positive demonstration he could present 
in rebuttal. The incidence of judicial review and of theory of valuation upon the 
interests of the consumer invites the opposite conclusion. 
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liberately contrived to keep issues unsettled.56 An answer eventually 
given-after the last appeal has been made and the ultimate error cor-
rected-is already outmoded. In these days matters industrial move 
with a brisk staccato; and under so cumbersome a method of fixing a 
price, rates are too inflexible to respond to changing conditions. They 
cannot, with neatness and dispatch, be made to insure a definite gross 
income or a certain rate of return. The prevailing arrangements have 
had their effect upon the utilities. The attention of management has 
been riveted upon the problem of the rate-base; its augmentation has 
become a conscious end of policy. The energy, thought, and initiative 
which in many another industry is directed to the elimination of waste, 
the advancement of technology, and the enlargement of markets is in the 
utilities spent in a continuous act of pecuniary creation. A concentra-
tion upon the value of the property is at variance with sound business 
and efficient administration. 
A rate-structure is not to be insulated against the general trend of 
development. In other domains of industry there are a host of con-
siderations with which price must come to grips. As time goes its way, 
needs change with circumstance and the terms of the equation of policy 
must be newly weighted to an ever-current relevancy. The rate-struc-
ture is a single facet of a public policy, driven along by many consider-
ations and expressed in many measures. The structure of rates must 
itself be tempered to a general necessity and a public obligation which 
lie beyond its immediate concern. A task such as this can neither be 
shaped into a litigious formula nor fitted to the decorous process of legal 
justice. Like value itself, the procedure is relative; no element can be 
isolated for measurement against the standard. It is the delicate reso-
lution of considerations as an entity-of which the rate structure is an 
expression in pecuniary magnitudes-that is the subject of judgment. 
Its continuous process of revision calls for a flexible, prompt and de-
cisive agency of control which can for the occasion say the final word-
and yet allow a continuing policy to be shaped to an ever new necessity. 
As a matter of public concern a rate-structure cannot be a static 
affair. It must be suited to its function-not exist as an expression of 
bygone transactions and law-made values to which the course of events 
must bow: Its ultimate reference is not to the calculus of a market 
established upon presumptions but to the potential wealth which it can 
""See Mr. Justice Black's statement about the interminable time a rate case 
takes, in protest against the remanding of McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 
U.S. 419, 423, 424 (1938). The case of Chicago telephone rates is notorious. See 
Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930), appeal dismissed, 283 
U.S. 808 (1931); Lindheimer v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U.S. 151 (1934). 
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call into being. It must rest upon estimate, grounded in deliberate ex-
perience, rather than upon record. 
A commitment to policy is an act of prophecy. It is, in the making 
of rates, an aspect of a developing program. Like any other matter of 
policy, the answer does not come by way of fact and logic. The creation 
of a rate-structure demands a definition of ends. Its content must 
emerge from what it is expected to do. And the ends which must shape 
policy are to be discovered, not in the rigid terms of a judicial formula 
for value, but in the pulsing vitality of an industrial system that is 
made to serve the necessities of a people. 
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